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Abstract 
This paper exploits the theoretical connections between employer-paid parking at the CBD and city size, urban 
welfare, land rents and car commuting using a spatial general equilibrium model with two transportation modes and 
endogenous residential parking. 
Our results show that employer-paid parking at the CBD is an ending parking subsidy that shifts a commuter’s 
decision towards driving to work by changing the relative costs structure of transport modes. By shifting population 
densities from locations near downtown towards the suburbs, the subsidy also increases the share of workers driving 
to work and expands the city size. However, the net impact on residential parking land cannot be signed in general 
because the effects on housing units and parking spaces per dwelling at a particular location in the city run in opposite 
directions. 
In addition, because employer-paid parking leads urban residents to prefer locations farther from the city core, 
residential land rent close to the downtown district decreases while, the value of residential land at central-suburban 
and in the suburbs increases. On the other hand, city residents as group generally benefit from employer-paid parking.  
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1. Introduction 
According to the 2000 Census, around 75.6% of U.S. workers drove alone to work in 2000. 
After a decade of rising gas prices, billions spent on transit and huge media hype over shifts to 
public transportation, the big surprise out of the 2010 U.S. Census, has been the continued growth 
over the last decade in driving alone to work. Between 2000 and 2010, driving alone to work 
increased by 7.8 million out of a total of 8.7 million increase in total jobs, implying that this mode 
of transport reached 76.5% of the U.S. workers. 
Parking subsidies such as employer-paid parking and parking requirements on zoning 
ordinances have long been criticized for greatly contributing to this type of behavior (Willson and 
Shoup 1990b; Shoup and Breinholt 1997; Shoup 2011). After all, when considering how to get to 
work, the availability of free parking can be a key factor. In particular, employer paid-parking is a 
form of matching grant whereby an employer offers to pay the cost of parking if employees are 
willing to pay all other cost of driving to work. As a result, employees have the incentive to drive 
alone to work because they are able to park for free (Shoup and Willson 1992a). Even in central 
areas such as downtown Los Angeles where parking is most expensive, many auto commuters who 
drive park free (Willson and Shoup 1990a, Shoup 2011). 
Solo driving has nevertheless been shown to contribute to high levels of traffic congestion and 
air pollution in metropolitan areas (Shoup and Willson 1992b). Strategies such as cash-out 
programs have been advocated and implemented as an attempt to correct for the price distortion 
introduced by employer-paid parking and thus, reduce the number of car commuters. For example, 
the state of California has a parking cash-out law whereby employers who subsidize parking, 
transit or vanpool rides are required to give commuters the option of receiving taxable cash instead. 
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Yet, these commuting programs are seldom enforced and employee participation in these 
programs may be affected negatively if the cash subsidy is low and/or if the job site is located in 
an area with poor transit service. 
One reason that has been pointed out for leading employers to provide subsidized free parking 
at work is the U.S. federal tax policy which exempts this subsidy from both income and payroll 
taxes, while cash is taxable (Shoup 2011). By distorting the employers’ choices about 
transportation fringe benefits, the current tax code also distorts commuters’ transportation 
decisions. Free or subsidized parking can also be used to attract and retain employees or enhance 
the availability of the employee to work extra hours. Moreover, free parking is a non-salary benefit 
that is easier to cut than salary. 
Even though employer-paid parking is an important feature of workplace parking pricing and 
has been a hot topic in the policy arena over the last decade, there is remarkably little analytical 
work on the effects of this type of parking subsidy. To our knowledge, none of the existing 
theoretical studies on parking pricing examines simultaneously, within a reasonably realistic 
spatial general equilibrium model, the various effects of employer-paid parking. Such effects 
include switching between travel modes, changes in overall welfare, and changes in land area and 
structural densities. Most of the theoretical studies on parking pricing focus either on the efficiency 
of second-best pricing of parking spots in the absence of congestion tolls (Arnott et al. 1991; Arnott 
and Rowse 1999; Verhoef et al. 1995; Calthrop et al. 2000; Anderson and de Palma 2004) or on 
the effects of parking and transit subsidies on the CBD size (Voith 1998) or on the role of 
employer-paid parking for the desirability of congestion tax reform and for the relative efficiency 
of recycling instruments (De Borger and Wuyts 2009). 
4 
 
The goal of this paper is thus to develop a spatial general equilibrium model which allows one 
to deal with changes in modal choice, urban welfare and urban form of ending parking subsidies 
in a closed city.  
The model is based on residential location and includes two competitive transport modes. 
Housing is portrayed as a commodity with two attributes, namely floor space and parking spaces, 
which are both choice variables of the housing developer. Residential parking is assumed to 
consume a fixed amount of land per parking space. All urban residents are car owners and 
commute to job sites in the downtown district either by public transit or car. It is also assumed that 
workers commuting by car do not pay the full resource cost of parking at the workplace because 
of (full or partially) employer-paid parking. Within this framework we examine the distributional 
and spatial effects of employer-paid parking at the CBD.  
The results of this paper are highly intuitive and can be summarized as follows. Employer-paid 
parking at the CBD is an ending parking subsidy that shifts a commuter’s decision towards driving 
to work by changing the relative costs structure of transport modes. We also show that by shifting 
population densities from locations near downtown towards the suburbs, this subsidy increases the 
share of workers driving to work as well as the city size. However, the net impact on residential 
parking land cannot be signed in general because the effects on housing units and parking spaces 
per dwelling at a particular location run in opposite directions. 
Another finding is that employer-paid parking has non-homogenous spillover effects 
throughout the city. Since employer-paid parking leads urban residents to prefer locations farther 
from the city core, residential land rent close to the downtown district decreases while, the value 
of residential land at central-suburban and in the suburbs increases. On the other hand, city 
residents as group generally benefit from employer-paid parking. Workers in the auto part of the 
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city experience an increase in their income net of transport costs, while workers in the transit part 
of the city benefit from lower housing rental prices. Thus, landowners in the transit part of the city 
(that is, in locations near the CBD) are the ones who actually lose from this type of commuting 
subsidy. And, workers commuting to work by public transit may actually like subsidies to 
suburban automobile users because this decreases the pressure on the housing market near the city 
core. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
theoretical model and discuss the optimality conditions. Section 3 analyses the spatial behavior of 
choice variables, and section 4 discusses the urban equilibrium conditions. Section 5 then presents 
the market equilibrium comparative statics of a change in employer-paid parking. Finally, the last 
section offers conclusions.  
 
2. Model 
Suppose a linear city extending from a Central Business District (CBD), located at zero, to the 
urban fringe x . The city consists in N urban residents who are assumed to be renters, car owners 
and to have identical tastes and income. Urban residents reside outside the CBD and commute to 
work either by car or public transit. All car commuters park at work. Let x denote distance from 
the place of residence to the CBD, cN  the total number of residents driving to work and bN  the 
number of residents using public transit. To the extent that all residents either take the public transit 
or drive to work in the CBD, the urban population satisfies the condition 
 cb NNN                                                                                                                           (1) 
Land is owned by absentee landowners and ar  is the exogenous rural land rent. 
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Transportation Costs 
The cost of auto commuting includes a variable cost and parking costs and is represented by  
  sfxyt ccc                                                                                                                   (2) 
where xtc denotes a part of cost varying proportionally with distance such as fuel costs, xc  is the 
time spent in car travel which is valued at the individual wage rate y , cf  represents parking cost 
at the CBD and s  the employer subsidy for parking at the workplace. 
On the other hand, commuting by public transit costs  
yxf bb                                                                                                                                  (3) 
where bf denotes the fixed costs in the case of public transit such as fares and yxb  represents the 
time cost to an urban resident using public transit.  
We assume that cb    and bc ff  . Commuting to work by car is faster but entails a higher 
fixed cost. In addition we assume the variable cost of using the car is lower than that of using 
public transit, yyt bcc   . 
Under the costs functions (2) and (3), an urban resident chooses between the two transport 
modes according to his location. That is, an urban resident located x  miles from the CBD chooses 
commuting to work by public transit if 
yxfsfxyt bbccc   ][                                                                                               (4) 
Therefore, there is a cutoff distance, denoted as modal boundary ( xˆ ), where urban residents, 
are indifferent between using the car and public transit and which satisfies the following conditions 
ccb
bc
tyy
fsf
x




ˆ                                                                                                                   (5) 
xx  ˆ0                                                                                                                                    (6) 
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Conditions (5) and (6) imply that both modes are used in the city and that close to the CBD 
urban residents will always commute by public transit.  
 
Residential Bid Rent Functions 
Residents’ tastes are represented by mqmqU  )()(),,(   where m  is consumption of 
a numeraire non-housing commodity,    is the number of parking spaces per dwelling and q  is 
consumption of housing, measured in square feet of floor space. We assume that 0q , 0qq  
and 0 , 0  . 
While the price of the composite good is assumed to be the same everywhere in the city (taken 
to be unity for simplicity), the rental price per square foot of housing floor space, denoted R , varies 
with location.  
Since urban residents are identical, the urban equilibrium must yield identical utility levels for 
all individuals. Spatial variation in R  allows equal utilities throughout the city.  In particular, the 
price per square foot of housing varies over space so that the highest utility level attainable at each 
location equals a constant level of utility U . Given residents choice of transport modes implied 
by (5) and (6), the maximum amount an urban resident living at distance x  from the CBD would 
be willing to pay for a dwelling of size q  with   parking spaces at a given utility level and income 
level satisfies 






xxxforxytsfyUq
xxforyxfyUq
xR
ccc
bb
ˆ][)()(
ˆ0)()(
)(


                                    (7) 
The bid function is increasing and concave in the housing attributes, and decreasing in the 
given level of utility.  
The Costs of Residential Parking 
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For simplicity, we assume the only type of residential parking provided in the city is surface 
parking.  The cost per residential parking space can be represented as  
lrKi                                                                                                                                       (8)                                                                                     
where r  and i  are the prices of land and capital, K is the fixed amount of capital per surface 
parking space and l is the fixed amount of land per surface parking space. While the price of 
capital is assumed to be exogenous and uniform across space, the price of land is endogenously 
determined and varies over space. 
 
Housing Developers 
The amount of floor space in a developer’s complex is given by ),( LKH , where K  is the 
capital input and L  is the amount of building land and H is a strictly concave and homogenous of 
degree one. The intensive form of this production function is written as )(Sh , where S  is capital 
per unit of covered land or structural density and h  satisfies 0sh  and 0ssh . )(Sh  represents 
residential total floor space per unit of building land. Since q  is floor space per dwelling, it follows 
that the number of dwellings in a complex is given by 
q
LKH ),(
, which can be written as 
q
SLh )(
.  
Given the preceding discussion, the developer’s profit equals 
 






 riSkilrxqR
q
Sh
L ][),,(
)(
                                                                                 (9) 
where the expression in brackets in (9), denoted  , is profit per acre of building land and 
),,( xqR  is defined by (7). For fixed L , developers choose q ,   and S  to maximize (9) and 
competition bids up land rent r  until maximized profit per acre equals zero. Since total profit is 
zero regardless of the value of L , the scale of the developer’s building is indeterminate.  
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Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions for choice of structural density, 
dwelling size and parking spaces per dwelling that must be met are respectively1 
0]][),,,([
)(



ikilrUxqR
q
Sh
S
s 

                                                                     (10) 
0]
][),,,(
[
)(





q
kilrUxqR
R
q
Sh
q
q

                                                                   (11) 
0][
)(



kilrR
q
Sh



                                                                                                (12) 
and the zero profit condition is  
  0][),,,()(  riSkilrUxqR
q
Sh
                                                                    (13) 
Equation (10) says that structural density is expanded until the marginal increase in revenue 
per acre of building land equals the marginal increase in cost from the extra capital plus the 
marginal increase in parking land cost required to hold parking spaces per dwelling fixed. 
Equation (11) says that dwelling size is expanded until the marginal decrease in revenue per 
acre of building land equals the marginal decrease in parking land cost from holding the number 
of parking spaces per dwelling fixed.  
Finally, equation (12) says that the number of parking spaces per dwelling should be increased 
until the net increase in revenue per acre of building land equals zero. 
The Hessian matrix of  evaluated at the solution to (10)-(12) may be written  
                                                          
1 While the utility level U is ultimately endogenous, it is viewed as parametric at this stage in the analysis. Moreover, 
if we consider the case where surface parking spaces per dwelling equals zero (a corner solution), then condition (12) 
would be replaced by the following three Kuhn Tucker conditions: 0 , 0][
)(
 kilrR
q
Sh
and 
0][
)(
 kilrR
q
Sh
 . 
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





















R
q
h
R
q
h
kilrR
q
h
D qq
ss
00
00
00]][[
                                                           (14) 
The negative definiteness of D  required by the second-order condition is guaranteed by 0ssh
and the strict concavity of R , where 0qqR  and 0R . Thus, 01 D , 02 D and 
0]][[
3
2
 kilrR
q
hRRh
D
qqss


. 
We now proceed to examine how the main endogenous variables vary over space. 
 
3. Spatial Behavior of the Main Endogenous Variables 
Spatial Behavior of S , q ,   and hql /  
We now focus on the spatial behavior of structural density ( S ), dwelling size ( q ), parking 
spaces per dwelling ( ) and land per dwelling ( hql / ). 
Differentiating (13) with respect to x  while taking into account (7) and (10)-(12) yields, after 
some manipulations, 
















xxfor
Sh
q
l
yt
xxfor
Sh
q
l
y
r
cc
b
x
ˆ0
)(
][
ˆ0
)(




                                                                                       (15) 
According to (15) residential land rent decreases with distance from the CBD but exhibits a 
kink at the boundary between the two transport modes. At the modal boundary xˆ , structural 
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density, dwelling size and the number of parking spaces per dwelling are the same regardless of 
which mode the urban resident selects since transportation costs are the same at xˆ . Note that )(xr  
is not differentiable at xx ˆ  because )(xR  is not differentiable at xx ˆ , but left and right 
differentiable at that point. Equation (15) shows that the residential land rent associated with the 
automobile is less steep at xx ˆ . 
Totally differentiating (10) - (12) taking account of the dependence of r on x  and solving for 
xS , xq  and x  using Cramer’s rule gives, after simplifying, the following results:  
0
]][[




kilrRhh
qrh
S
ss
xs
x

                                                                                               (16) 
0
qq
x
x
hR
r
q                                                                                                                       (17) 
0


R
rl x
x                                                                                                                        (18) 
Let hql / . Taking advantage of the results thus far, it is possible to derive the spatial 
behavior of the amount of land per dwelling in the following way: 
0
2



q
qhhq
l xxxx                                                                                                     (19) 
Moreover, the amount of land at location x  is given by )()( xxN   where )(xN  is the number of 
dwellings. Thus, 
)(
1
)()(
)(
xxxN
xN

 represents population density at location x which, exhibits a 
the spatial behavior described by 
0
1
2









x
x
                                                                                                                  (20) 
12 
 
According to (16)-(18), buildings have fewer storeys farther from the CBD and dwellings are 
bigger closer to the edge of the city. Moreover, the number of residential parking spaces per 
dwelling increases with distance from the CBD, implying that bigger houses are bundled with 
more parking spaces. Equations (19) and (20) also reveal that urban residents consume more land 
as we move away from downtown (where land is typically more expensive) and population density 
decreases with distance from the CBD. 
 
4. Urban Equilibrium Conditions 
Next, we turn to the analysis of the urban equilibrium under the assumption of a closed city, 
where population ( N ) is viewed as fixed, while the urban utility level is determined within the 
system. The first spatial equilibrium condition requires that urban land rent at the edge of the city, 
x , must equal the agricultural land rent 
arsUxr ),,(                                                                                                                        (21) 
The second equilibrium condition is that population must fit inside the city. The population 
condition must also reflect mode choice.2 
Ndx
x
dx
x
x
x c
x
b
 
ˆ
ˆ
0
)(
1
)(
1

                                                                                                 (22) 
or3 
 accbccccb rytNyytUrtyyUxr  ][])[,0(])[,ˆ(                                      (23) 
                                                          
2 We define i  with cbi , as the total amount of land per dwelling under mode i . 
3 Recall that land size at location x  is fixed and equal to 1. From (15) we get 
yb
bxrxb

 )(  and 
ycct
cxrxc



)(  
which, we insert back into (22). Then, integrating while taking into account (21) and that )ˆ()ˆ( xcrxbr   yields, after 
some manipulations, (23). 
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Since )(/1 x  represents population density and the city is linear with unit width, the integrals 
in (22) aggregate total residents out to the urban boundary and equate it to N . Finally, the number 
of workers commuting by car is determined as 
yt
rUxr
dx
x
N
cc
a
x
x
c
 

 
),ˆ(
)(
1
ˆ
.                                                                                              (24) 
Together (21), (23) and (24) constitute a system of equations that can be solved for the 
unknowns U , x  and cN . 
 
5. The Effects of Employer-Paid Parking  
Within the above framework, we now examine the effects of a marginal increase in s  on the 
optimal values of structural density, dwelling size, residential parking supply, commuting mode 
choice, city size and urban welfare.  
 
Impacts on the Modal Boundary  
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to s  yields           
0
1ˆ



ccb tyyds
xd

                                                                                                     (25) 
Thus, since an increase in employer paid parking decreases the generalized costs of commuting 
to work by car, the modal boundary is shortened meaning that urban residents at the old modal 
boundary shift from transit to auto after an increase in the parking subsidy.  
 
Impacts on Utility level and Residential Land Rent  
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Totally differentiating (23) with respect to s  while substituting (25), yields the impact of a 
change in employer-paid parking on residents’ welfare as                                                                
0
)]0()ˆ(][[)0(
)0(





xtyy
y
ds
Ud
ccb
b                                                                        (26) 
On the other hand, the impacts of a change in employer-paid parking on residential 
landowners’ welfare can be described by the change on the residential land rent profile. 
0
)0(
1)0(

ds
Ud
ds
dr

                                                                                                         (27) 
0
]])[ˆ(])[0(][[
][
ˆ
)ˆ(
1)ˆ(











ytxtyytyy
tyy
ds
xd
y
ds
Ud
xds
xdr
ccccbccb
ccb
b




                                   (28)              
The above comparative static analysis reveals city residents as group generally benefit from 
employer-paid parking. On the other hand the impact of an increase in employer-paid parking on 
landowners is not the same everywhere in the city. In particular, it is shown that residential land 
rent near the CBD decreases while residential land rent at locations farther from the business 
district increases.  
Intuitively, when there is an increase in employer-paid parking, driving costs to work decrease 
because there is a reduction in parking costs at work, which eases suburban access. Because 
commuting by car is cheaper, some of the urban residents who originally were commuting by 
public transit will now use the car. Since they use the car, they are motivated to relocate to farther 
from the CBD. On the other hand, for those urban residents already using the automobile, the 
income net transport cost increases. These two effects together bids up housing bid rents in the 
area of the city where the car is the transportation mode to commute to work, while depressing 
housing bid rents near the CBD. Note that the attributes of public transit did not change and 
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therefore, workers who keep commuting by public transit must now enjoy a higher utility because 
housing rents are lower everywhere in their residential area. This, in turn, results in lower 
residential land rents in central areas of the city. 
 
Impact on the Number of Workers Commuting by Car 
Totally differentiating (24) with respect to s  and using (25) and (26), yields after simplifying 
0
]])[ˆ(])[0(][[
1



ytxtyytyyds
dN
ccccbccb
c

                                    (29) 
Given the above discussion, it is not surprising the positive sign of (27), meaning employer-
paid parking increases the number of workers driving to work. Further intuition can be gained by 
examining the impacts on city size and population densities. 
 
Impact on the urban boundary 
Totally differentiating (21) with respect to s  while substituting (25) and (26) yields,  
0
)]0()ˆ(][[)0(
)0()ˆ(
1
1
















xtyy
x
ds
Ud
tyds
xd
ccb
cc                                                                       (30) 
since )0()ˆ(  x . Thus an increase in employer-paid parking expands the city boundary, whereby 
the size of the city gets larger. It is worth mentioning that this expansion in city size is larger, the 
biggest the difference between the highest amount of land per dwelling in the transit part of the 
city and the lowest amount of land per dwelling in the auto part of the city. 
 
Impact on structural density, dwelling size and residential parking spaces per dwelling  
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 Totally differentiating (12) with respect to s  while taking into account the dependence of the 
land rent on s , yields  
 0
)0()0(

ds
dr
R
l
ds
d


 and 0
)ˆ()ˆ(

ds
xdr
R
l
ds
xd


                                                        (31)                
given (27) and (28) and that 0R . According to (31), the number of parking spaces per 
dwelling increases in central locations and decreases at farther locations from the CBD. This 
suggests that employer-paid parking at the CBD influences market residential parking supply 
throughout the city, leading to more parking spaces per dwelling near the center than in the absence 
of the subsidy.   
The impacts on structural density at the CBD and at the modal boundary can also be examined 
by first computing uS  and then using (26) and (28) to evaluate, yields
4  
0
])0([)0(
)0(
)0(




ds
Ud
kilrRhh
qh
ds
Ud
S
ds
dS
ss
s
u

                                                                       (32) 
.0
)ˆ(
])ˆ([
)ˆ(
ˆ
)ˆ(
)ˆ(




ds
xdr
kilrxRhh
qh
ds
Ud
xS
ds
xd
xS
ds
xdS
ss
s
ux

                                                                       (33) 
By a similar method, we can find the effects on dwelling size at the city center and at the modal 
boundary by determining the sign of5 
                                                          
4The partial effect of uS  was determined by totally differentiating the system of equations (10)-(12) evaluated at the 
initial equilibrium with respect to the exogenous parameter of interest while taking into account the dependence of r
on U  and  then using Cramer’s rule to find the result.  
5 The partial effect of uq  was determined by totally differentiating the system of equations (10)-(12) evaluated at the 
initial equilibrium with respect to the exogenous parameter of interest while taking into account the dependence of r
on U  and then using Cramer’s rule to find the result.  
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                                                                            (35) 
According to the above comparative statics, an increase in employer-paid parking also does 
not have the same effect in dwelling size and structural density everywhere in the city. After an 
increase in s , structural density decreases and dwelling size increases in central locations while 
the opposite effects occur as we move towards central-suburban and suburban locations. Given the 
above spatial impacts on the profile of dwelling sizes and structural densities, it is also the case 
that employer-paid parking at the CBD decreases population density near downtown while 
increasing population densities in suburban areas. Since there is a fixed number of workers that 
must be housed in the city, this can also explain the expansion of the city size after an increase in 
s . Thus, by concentrating residences in central-suburban and suburban areas, employer-paid 
parking increases the number of workers driving to work. 
 
Impact on Residential Parking Land 
Total parking land is 
x
p dxxxNlL
0
)()(  . By differentiating pL  with  respect to s yields 
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                                                    (36) 
While the first term on the right-hand-side of (36) is positive, the second term sign cannot be 
determined. The reason is because the effect of an increase in s  on the number of dwellings and 
parking spaces per dwelling provided at a given location run in opposite directions.  
Take for example what happens in locations near downtown. While the subsidy’s depressing 
effect on the number of housing units provided reduces parking land, a countervailing effect from 
more parking spaces per dwelling may dominate, raising parking land in this part of the city. The 
same set of effects, but with opposite directions, also occur in suburban areas, where the number 
of housing units increase but the number of parking spaces per dwelling decreases after an increase 
in s . Thus, the net effect of an increase in employer-paid parking on the amount of land allocated 
to residential parking is ambiguous in general. Note, however, that if the number of parking spaces 
is held fixed, then the amount of residential parking land would decrease in central areas while 
increasing in the suburbs.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper exploits the theoretical connections between employer-paid parking and city size, 
urban welfare, land rents and car commuting. Using a spatial general equilibrium model with two 
competing transport modes and endogenous residential parking, the paper results are in line with 
those of Willson and Shoup (1990) and Shoup’s (1997) case studies. Therefore, on the one hand 
this paper complements existing anecdotal literature on the effects of employer-paid parking. And 
on the other hand, by specifically modeling parking (an attribute of the house that consumes land) 
and the developers’ behavior, it also adds to the existing theoretical literature on the effects of 
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commuting subsidies on urban form and modal choice behavior (Sakasi 1989; Brueckner 2005; 
Su and DeSalvo 2008; Borck and Wrede 2008). 
Overall, the results show that employer-paid parking is an ending parking subsidy that shifts a 
commuter’s decision towards driving to work, increases the share of workers commuting to work 
by car and expands the urban boundary. To the extent that this subsidy increases the amount of 
parking demanded at the worksite, this parking subsidy may create an incentive for local 
governments requiring more parking in nonresidential areas. However, it has been shown that 
nonresidential parking requirements actually create an oversupply of parking (Cutter and Franco 
(2012)), which in turn would depress the cost of driving solo and create an incentive for auto 
commuting (Shoup 2005). Future research should explore the connections between employer-paid 
parking and local parking requirements and how these connections may exacerbate other urban 
problems such as traffic congestion and air pollution.  
We also show that residential land rent close to the downtown district decreases while the value 
of residential land at central-suburban and in the suburbs increases, when this type of parking 
subsidy is in place. In contrast, urban residents as a group gain with this type of subsidy.  
Another interesting finding is that employer-paid parking at the CBD influences the spatial 
supply of residential parking, leading central locations to supply more parking spaces per dwelling 
than in the absence of the subsidy. In addition, this parking subsidy also leads developers near the 
city core to provide fewer housing units than the market would have otherwise provided. Because 
the impacts on housing units and on parking spaces per dwelling run in opposite directions in both 
parts of the city, the net effect of employer-paid parking on residential parking land cannot be 
signed in general. Empirical work based on the current analysis would hence be useful avenue for 
future research. 
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There are nevertheless a couple of limitations to our analysis. In our analysis, we have 
abstracted from the possibility of workers been offered the option to cash-out their parking 
subsidies. Another type of incentive that has not been examined here, and that can be the topic of 
future research, is an employer-paid transit pass scheme. Under this commuting program, the 
employer pays the cost of employees’ transit, converting the fixed cost for parking spaces into a 
variable cost for the public transportation subsidy. The effects of subsidies to public transit have 
nevertheless been analyzed in the monocentric city model with two transportation modes and no 
congestion. For example, Sasaki (1989) has shown that a decrease in either the basic fare or in the 
proportional part of the fare leads to contraction of the city and to a reduction of the rent in the 
suburban area. However, rent in central locations decreases also when there is a drop in the 
proportional part of the fare but it can increase if the subsidy is on the basic fare. Hence, it would 
be interesting to examine the distributional and efficiency effects of alternative commuting 
subsidies in the presence of traffic and parking congestion externalities.  
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